From 'Theories of Hegemony' to 'Hegemony Analysis' in International Relations by Antoniades, Andreas
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FROM ‘THEORIES OF HEGEMONY’ TO ‘HEGEMONY 
ANALYSIS’ IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
 
 
 
Andreas Antoniades 
Director, Centre for Global Political Economy (CGPE) 
Lecturer in Global Political Economy 
Department of International Relations 
University of Sussex 
Brighton BN1 9SN, UK 
Tel: +44 (0)1273 872735 
Email: A.A.Antoniades@sussex.ac.uk 
 
 
Paper presented at: 
49
th
 ISA Annual Convention  
Panel: Hegemony, Security, and Defense in IR 
28 March 2008 
 San Francisco 
USA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
From ‘Theories of Hegemony’ to ‘Hegemony Analysis’ in International Relations 
 
Andreas Antoniades 
Department of International Relations 
University of Sussex 
 
 
Despite the centrality of the concept of hegemony to any aspect of the discipline of 
International Relations (IR), IR seems to lack an analytical framework for studying 
hegemony. As a result there seems to be no way of comparing the characteristics of the 
different approaches to hegemony, and their implications for world politics theory and 
practice. The downside of this situation became apparent after the terrorist strikes on the 
World Trade Center, in 2001. Issues of hegemony, hegemonic power, benign and malign 
hegemons, and so on returned to the top of the IR agenda. Moreover, concepts such as 
empire and imperial power gained new currency in IR’s attempt to make sense of the new 
dynamics at work in world politics. Yet, to a significant extend this revived field of 
hegemony analysis in IR remained rather fragmented and particularistic. No systematic 
attempt was made to examine how the different approaches to hegemony complement or 
relate to each other. Thus instead of emerging as a unified field of research, the study of 
hegemony remained compartmentalised along the traditional dividing lines of the 
established IR approaches. This paper aims at addressing this problem by examining how 
the analysis of hegemony in IR could be established as a ‘unified’ field1.  
 
The organisation of the paper is as follows. Firstly, I attempt a cartography of the existing 
approaches to hegemony in IR. Secondly, I discuss and evaluate two significant attempts 
to create a comprehensive framework for studying hegemony in world politics. The first 
was based on an agential understanding of hegemony; the second attempted to 
complement this agential approach with a structural dimension. The third section 
discusses the limitations of these two approaches and proposes a new way towards a 
comprehensive analysis of hegemony in IR.   
 
 
Hegemony in the IR Cage 
 
Contemporary IR research has used the concepts of the hegemon and hegemony to 
examine and analyse dynamics, strategies, attitudes, entities or properties that focus on, 
cut across or transcend the traditional three images of world politics, i.e. the individual, 
the state and the international system (see Waltz, 1959)
2
. The great majority of works that 
deal with the concept of hegemony share a common element, that can be taken to be the 
key defining characteristic of the concept of hegemony in IR. That is, the concept of 
hegemony may imply a great capacity for coercion and/or a great degree of influence or 
control of the structures of the international system and the international behaviour of its 
units, but it excludes situations where we have the establishment of relations of direct and 
official control of foreign governments or territories. Along these lines, for instance, we 
                                              
1
 A caveat is useful here. In social sciences, the concept of ‘theory of hegemony’ (in singular) refers to 
Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony (Gramsci, 1971) and to approaches that borrow or are inspired by 
him (see for instance Laclau, 2000). In this paper the concept of ‘hegemony’ is used to define a field of 
inquiry of which the Gramscian notion of hegemony is but one part. 
2
 The concepts of hegemony and hegemon have a long pedigree in International Relations. Two foundation 
stones for much IR theorising is Thucydides’s The Peloponnesian War [1961], which deals with the 
Athenian hegemony and its implications for the Greek city-state system, and Nicolo Machiavelli’s The 
Prince (1905), which deals with the issue of the hegemon and control of the state.  
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can distinguish the concept of hegemony from the concept of colonisation (which implies 
direct, official control). Thus, hegemony differs from any form of relationship that 
implies direct management or ownership of foreign territories. Consequently, the concept 
of hegemony does not cover forms of domination such as annexing, occupation or 
acquisition of foreign territories or populations (among others see Doyle, 1986; Ferguson, 
2004?; for a critique see Rapkin, 2005).  
 
Four approaches to hegemony 
 
The conventional approach: In most mainstream IR literature the concept of hegemony 
has conventionally been used to signify a condition of disequilibrium of power in the 
international system, in which one state becomes so powerful that can exercise leadership 
in or dominance over the international system (for a classical statement see Gilpin, 1981). 
This state, often referred to as hegemon, hegemonic power or imperial power, has 
therefore the capacity to exercise fundamental control over the structures of the 
international system, as well as the (international) behaviour of its constitutive units (see 
also Doyle, 1986: ch. 1). The factors on which the superiority of the hegemon may lie 
include geography, natural resources, industrial, financial and in general economic 
capacity, military capacity and preparedness, population (including both quantitative and 
qualitative aspects such as education), morale and unity, quality of diplomacy and 
government, technological innovation etc (Morgenthau, 1965). Ikenberry and Kupchan 
(1990: 287-288) sum up some of these factors by arguing that ‘the constitutive elements 
of hegemonic power include military capabilities; control over raw materials, markets, 
and capital; and competitive advantages in highly valued good’.      This conventional 
approach to hegemony has been challenged from two sides in IR.   
 
The neoliberal approach: Firstly, by neoliberalism, as a critique of ‘hegemonic stability 
theory’ (HST). The neorealist ‘Hegemonic stability theory’ and its advocates supported 
that an open and liberal world economy requires the existence of a hegemonic or 
dominant power (Charles Kindleberger, 1973, esp. ch. 14; Stephen Krasner, 1976; for an 
overview, Gilpin, 1987: 72-80, 85-92). This assumption was challenged by the neoliberal 
literature on regimes and international institutions developed since the late 1980s. A 
milestone in this regard was the special issue of International Organization (IO) on 
International Regimes, edited by Krasner in 1982 (volume 36, no. 2; later published also 
as an edited volume; see Krasner, 1983). Counter to the HST, the IO issue concluded that 
international regimes have an independent causal affect in world politics (i.e. although 
they may be a product of hegemonic power, they are not reducible to it). This argument 
was then advanced further by Robert Keohane in his book After Hegemony (1984), where 
he argued that an international system could continue to function through its international 
institutions even after the decline or collapse of the hegemon that had created it in the 
first place. Thus, according to the neoliberal approach, although a hegemon is a necessary 
condition for the construction of a hegemony (a specific international order), hegemony 
itself can outlive the hegemon. In this manner, neoliberalism attempted to shift the focus 
of analysis from the subject of hegemony (i.e. the hegemon) to the conditions and 
mechanisms of its operation.   
  
The Gramscian approach: The second challenge to the conventional approach to 
hegemony came from the Critical IR scholarship and was based on Antonio Gramsci’s 
notion of Hegemony. Gramsci (1971: 366, 166??) argued that there are two types of 
political control: domination that is based on coercion, and hegemony that is based on 
consent. Hegemony, for Gramsci signifies the process through which the leading group / 
ruling class of a society transforms its own interests and values into ‘common sense’ for 
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all the members of this society. Along these lines, Neo-Gramscian scholars have argued 
that in order IR to conceptualise how hegemony operates in the international system, it 
must move from a state-centric reading of the world system, where social forces are seen 
through national lens, to a reading of this system as a ‘totality’ (see Gill, 1993a: 41-42). 
In Robert Cox’s (1993: 61-62) terms ‘[h]egemony in the international level is…not 
merely an order among states… World hegemony is describable as a social…an 
economic…and a political structure… World hegemony…is expressed in universal 
norms, institutions and mechanisms which lay down general rules of behaviour for states 
and for those forces of civil society that act across national boundaries – rules which 
support the dominant mode of production’. The Gramscian approach locates the subject 
of hegemony not in a powerful state but in transnational social forces that dominate in the 
mode of production. Without diminishing the importance of material power and 
dominance over material resources, it understands hegemony not in terms of coercion, 
but in terms of consent, shared beliefs and commonsense. As Cox (1993: 52) argues 
‘Gramsci took over from Machiavelli the image of power as a centaur: half man, half 
beast, a necessary combination of consent and coercion. To the extent that the consensual 
aspect of power is in the forefront, hegemony prevails. Coercion is always latent but is 
only applied in marginal, deviant cases’. Thus, hegemony equals the establishment within 
the sphere of the international of universally accepted values – a commonsense. This 
Gramscian approach to hegemony came to complement Lenin’s analysis on imperialism 
and Marxist approaches that focused on coercion rather than consent (here one could 
include Dependency theory).    
 
The radical approach: Finally, a different approach to hegemony, which can be called 
radical, is taken by those scholars who are inspired by post-structuralism. The works of 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) 
are representative here. Both works are inspired by the work of Michel Foucault, but 
depart on the way they define hegemony and understand its mode of operation. Following 
Gramsci, Laclau (2000) understands hegemony as the moment that a specific 
particularity/project acquires a universal signification (see also Laclau, 1996). 
Furthermore, according to Laclau hegemony is a discursive order, i.e. it consists of a set 
of practices that has acquired an independent dynamic which is not reducible to the social 
forces that gave birth to it in the first place (see Foucault, 1972). Yet, the reproduction of 
hegemony depends to a great extend on the social forces from which it originates, and 
most importantly to the capacity of these forces to neutralise or resist, counter-hegemonic 
projects and forces.  Hardt and Negri (2000) on the other hand move from a Foucaultian 
understanding of discourse to Foucault’s and Deleuze’s analysis on biopolitics (Foucault, 
1978; Deleuze, 1988; 1992). They conceptualise hegemony, or to use their terms, empire, 
as a new international order that ‘becomes an integral, vital function that every individual 
embraces and reactivates of his or her own accord’ (Negri and Hardt, 2000: 24). Thus, 
empire is a decentred and deterritorialising apparatus of rule that ‘regulates social life 
from its interior’ (p.23). It does not influence, control, invest only the economic or the 
cultural dimension of society but rather the ‘social bios’ itself (p. 25). Therefore, they do 
not locate the subject of hegemony in any powerful state or group of states, or factor of 
production, but directly at the level of the individual.  
 
This paper contends that the above traditional IR framing of the theories of hegemony is 
not a productive way of thinking of and studying the phenomenon of hegemony in world 
politics. The main weakness of this framing is that it places more emphasis on established 
IR theories and their dividing lines and less on the phenomenon of hegemony itself. In 
this way, for instance, it ignores the overlapping between the neoliberal and Gramscian 
approaches to hegemony, or between the conventional and the Marxist/Dependency 
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theory approaches. To address these shortcomings one should move away from using IR 
theories as the point of departure for studying hegemony. That is, the focus of hegemony 
analysis in IR should be shifted from the dividing lines prescribed by IR theories to the 
different natures and operations of the phenomenon of hegemony itself. To do so, we 
suggest to use as our point of departure three parameters that refer directly to the nature 
of hegemony: first, the subject of hegemony; second, the conditions of existence and 
reproduction of hegemony; and third, the nature of the movement of power within 
hegemony. The first parameter deals with the nature of the subject of hegemony; is it, for 
instance, a state, a coalition or group of states, a coalition or group of economic or 
otherwise interests, a specific force of production such as the ‘capital’ in general or the 
financial capital in particular? Does hegemony have a subject at all? The second 
parameter deals with how hegemony is established and/or reproduced. Is it based on 
material factors such as economic incentives, specific membership advantages, or 
military force? Is it based on shared, consensual or normative beliefs? If there is no 
subject of hegemony, no hegemon, then how hegemony is possible, and how is it 
reproduced? Finally, the third parameter deals with the movement of power within the 
hegemonic order. Is power something external to the hegemon/hegemony or is it a vital 
element internal to it?  Is power a force that is exercised instrumentally by one entity over 
another, or is it a force that manifests itself ‘from within’ entities/individuals? Is 
hegemonic power a force that is moving top-down or bottom-up?   
 
There have already been insightful attempts in IR to move the study of hegemony beyond 
the dividing lines of IR theories, yet none of these attempts account for all the 
aforementioned parameters. The following section focuses on two such attempts.    
 
 
Hegemony outside the IR Cage 
 
Agential approaches  
A first group of approaches have tried to escape from the confines of traditional IR 
framing by focusing on the hegemon and the different types of power it uses to maintain 
its hegemony. Hegemony is thus conceptualised as a relationship between two (groups of) 
agents, the hegemon and the remaining units/actors of the system. Thus, these approaches, 
which can be referred to as agential (see also Joseph, 2000), bring together and analyse in 
a comparative way the different forms of power on which hegemonies can be built and 
maintained, and their implications in policy terms. 
 
Studying the nature of hegemonic power in international relations, John Ikenberry and 
Charles Kupchan (1990) for instance have distinguished between two forms of 
hegemonic power; one based on material incentives and one based on substantive beliefs. 
In this way their analysis brings together the conventional and the Gramscian approaches 
to Hegemony. In particular, they argue (p. 285-286): 
 
There are two basic ways in which a hegemonic nation can exercise power and 
secure the acquiescence of other nations. The first is by manipulating material 
incentives. Through threats of punishment or promises of reward, the hegemon 
alters the political or economic incentives facing other states…The second 
way…is by altering the substantive beliefs of leaders in other nations. Hegemonic 
control emerges when foreign elites…internalise the norms and value orientations 
espoused by the hegemon and accept its normative claims about the nature of the 
international system [the authors refer to this process as socialisation] …These 
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two ways of exercising hegemonic power are mutually reinforcing and frequently 
difficult to disentangle.   
 
With regard to the policy implications of these two different types of power, Ikenberry 
and Kupchan (1990: 287) argue that a hegemonic order that is ‘built on inducements and 
threats depends exclusively on the hegemon’s control of preponderant material resources’. 
On the other hand, a hegemony that encourages and promotes socialisation not only 
makes the running of hegemony easier but can also reduce significant its cost for the 
hegemon (with regard to the commitment of economic and material resources). This 
consensual dimension of ‘hegemonic management’ can also explain, according to their 
analysis, why specific hegemonic orders outlive their hegemons (a key point in neoliberal 
approaches to hegemony). Therefore, the analysis of this consensual dimension 
constitutes, for them, a significant factor in understanding the functioning and change of 
hegemonic systems. 
 
Clearly, Ikenberry and Kupchan’s analysis provides us with a way of bringing under a 
common framework of analysis insights from different IR theories. Their approach, 
however, is able to account only for approaches that assume the existence of a hegemonic 
actor. It does not leave any space to bring under the same analytical framework the 
approaches that do not adopt this assumption and/or that see hegemonic power as 
operating from within the subject (e.g. the radical approaches). Thus, their framework 
seems to allow variation only with regard to the second parameter mentioned above (i.e. 
the factors that affect the existence and reproduction of hegemony), while they keep 
constant the first parameter (i.e. they take for granted the existence of a hegemon) and do 
not sufficiently address the third parameter (i.e. the movement of power).  
 
Nonetheless such agential approaches to hegemony have helped hegemony analysis to 
escape from the confines of the established IR theories. They broke away from the 
traditional IR theory dividing lines and suggested a direct focus both on the hegemon and 
its way of rule. 
    
Structural approaches 
 
An insightful attempt to move beyond an agential framework of analysing hegemony has 
been offered by authors that follow a ‘critical realist’ analytical approach. Critical 
Realism (CR) is particularly helpful here because it is based on a ‘stratified social 
ontology’. That is, it differentiates between three different levels or domains of reality: 
the empirical, the actual and the real (McAnulla, 2005: 31; for Bhaskar’s original 
statement see Bhaskar, 1994; see also Patomaki and Wight, 2000). In terms of hegemony 
analysis, the empirical domain could, for instance, refer to the number of soldiers, 
military bases, and aircraft carriers that a state poses; the actual domain could refer to 
manifested ‘structural biases’, such as the inequality of payments between men and 
women in advanced capitalist societies, where, although there are no formal rules 
establishing this inequality, the latter is apparent when we compare the salaries between 
these two groups of the population; and the domain of the real which refers to 
‘underlying structures’, such as the maximum consumption that a socio-economic and 
environmental system can afford without collapsing
3
. What is important in this stratified 
                                              
3
 As Patomaki and Wight (2000: 223) argue, for CR, ‘[t]he world is composed not only of events, states of 
affairs, experiences, impressions, and discourses but also of underlying structures, power, and tendencies 
that exist, whether or not detected or known through experience and/or discourse. For critical realists this 
underlying reality provides the conditions of possibility for actual events and perceived and/or experienced 
phenomena’. 
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ontology is that the subject of power in these different domains is, or can be, different. 
Structural biases for instance may find their origins in historical socio-economic 
conditions that exceed the power and nature of any contemporary international hegemon.   
Thus, a critical realist analytical framework is able to account for variation along the first 
parameter mentioned above, i.e. the subject of hegemony. A CR framework, thus, can 
bring together a study of hegemony in terms of a state that poses overwhelming material 
power, with a study of hegemony where the latter is construed as a diffused and 
decentred apparatus of power that is ‘causally efficacious’. Furthermore, the stratified 
ontology of critical realism allows us to examine the different factors that affect the 
existence and reproduction of the different ‘types’ of hegemonies, no matter whether 
these are state military power, deterritorialised social networks or market forces, or 
historically inter-locked patterns of power relations.     
 
Along the above lines, Jonathan Joseph (2000) has attempted to complement the agential 
approaches to hegemony, with a structural approach. Following the stratified ‘ontological 
capacity’ of critical realism, he distinguishes between two different types of hegemony. 
The first type is the agential (or intersubjective) and gives primacy to social actors and 
their interaction. It thus focuses on group interests, specific political projects, social 
alliances, and other factors that relate to how social actors achieve dominance through 
constructing consent. The second type is structural hegemony and gives primacy to a 
deeper level of social institutionalisation, i.e. to the social mechanisms and structures that 
allow the social universe of world politics
4
 to hang together and be reproduced. Joseph 
(2000: 191) argues that this typology denotes a ‘distinction…between a deeper, structural 
hegemony which refers to the unity and reproduction of society and its structures and 
institutions and the agentially based hegemony of specific hegemonic projects’ , or put 
differently, ‘between hegemony’s basic material necessity and various forms of its 
actualisation through concrete projects and intentional agency’.  
 
The theoretical framework proposed by Joseph seems to push hegemony analysis from a 
unidimensional approach to hegemony that is focusing only on agents to a two-
dimentional approach that allows the study of hegemony as both an agential and 
structural phenomenon. Yet, Joseph’s conceptualisation of structure and structural 
hegemony seems to be rather restricting. His suggestion to conceptualise ‘structural 
hegemony’ as ‘hegemony’s basic material necessity’ (ibid.) seems to limit the  
phenomenon of structural hegemony to the (CR) realm of the real
5
. For critical realists 
the realm of real is a realm that is not consisted of inter-subjective entities and is not 
reducible to social interactions, but constitutes an objective, extradiscursive reality, ‘out-
there’ that has a real and not an intersubjective effect on the way people organise their 
lives, in the way gravity has a real impact on material things. Thus, in Joseph’s 
theoretical proposal, the only thing beyond agential hegemony seems to be 
extradiscursive/objective structures. The richness of the space in between these two sets 
of phenomena is not given enough space or attention. Similarly, the proposed dichotomy 
between agential and structural hegemony does not seem to be able to accommodate 
phenomena such as this of Empire proposed by Hardt and Negri.  
 
Notwithstanding, Joseph’s CR approach leads to two significant advancements to the 
study of hegemony in IR. First, it allows for different subjects of hegemony and, second, 
as a consequence of the first, it allows for an analytical and ontological differentiation 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 
4
 Joseph’s analysis focuses on domestic rather than world politics.  
5
 This realm of the real is what leads Critical Realism to a ‘depth ontology’ (McAnulla, 2005: 31). 
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between the hegemon (the agent) and hegemony (the structure).  This last point is 
particularly important for the purposes of this paper, for, a great part of hegemonic power 
is materialised and operates in the social space that exists in-between the hegemon and 
the ‘objective’, material limitations of hegemony.  
 
In this regard, it can be argued that Critical Realism opens the way for the third key 
parameter of hegemony analysis, the movement of power. The main argument here is that 
we can use this parameter to overcome the limitations of Joseph’s analytical framework. 
Thus rather than using agents and/or structures as our starting point in hegemony analysis 
in IR we suggest to use the ‘movement of power’, i.e. where does power come from, 
where is it targeted to and how does it operate? In this way hegemony analysis may 
interrogate better the space that lies between agents’ capacity and structural constraints, 
without ignoring either of these two. The following section approaches hegemony as a 
movement of power. 
 
Hegemony as Movement of Power 
To study hegemony as a movement of power, first we must examine the nature of the 
relationship between power and those who exercise it, objected to it or make it possible. 
Two issues are of specific importance here: (a) Is power an external characteristic (e.g. 
weaponry) or something that defines the internal composition of its subject (e.g. identity)? 
In the first case, it can be said that power is something that is external/outside to its 
subject, whereas in the second case it is internal/inside to it. (b) Does power aim to 
change only the external behaviour of its objects or does it aim to affect their internal 
composition and identity. In the first case, power targets the ‘outside’ of its objects, i.e. 
their external behaviour, whereas in the second it targets their inner nature. Following the 
analytical and ontological differentiations generated by these two questions we can 
distinguish among four different movements of power that correspond to four different 
types of hegemony in International Relations. Table 1 summarises their characteristics 
and the remaining of this section elaborates on their nature and relationship to the 
existing IR scholarship on hegemony.  
   
Table 1. Hegemony as a Movement of Power 
 
                                                    out                                                            in 
 
hegemony is conceptualised as the 
possession of overwhelming power (in 
terms of material capabilities) and the 
instrumental use of this power to 
secure leadership or dominance in 
world politics  
 
 
hegemony is conceptualised as a specific 
strategy aiming at generating shared 
beliefs and a commonsense – the aim is to 
achieve leadership or dominance on the 
basis of consent rather than coercion   
hegemony is conceptualised as a socio-
cultural project aiming to generate 
imitation within world politics, while 
assuming the existence/possibility of 
different socio-cultural projects and 
ways of being    
 
 
hegemony is conceptualised as a diffused 
and decentred apparatus of (bio)power 
aiming at the control and governing of 
human life from its interior 
 
 
Thus, the categories ‘inside/outside’ and ‘in/out’ in Table 1 aim at signifying the 
movement of power  within a hegemonic order (i.e. where does power come from, where 
is it targeted to and in what way). The ‘outside-out’ pair point to an instrumental use of 
power capabilities by one actor over another. Within this context, power is not about 
outside 
inside 
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personal beliefs or identity formation. It is a rather ‘outside’ property of both its owner 
and those who are subjected to it. In this regard, it requires both a clear ‘subject’ (the 
hegemonic power) and a clear target (the other states or actors within the international 
system). The approaches that employ this conceptualisation of hegemony employ a 
traditional one-dimensional concept of power, i.e. power is construed as the ability of A 
to get B to do something he would not otherwise do it (see Dahl, 1957: 202-203; Lukes, 
1974?). Such approaches to hegemony employ a ‘conventional’, top-down and ‘agential’ 
approach to hegemony. The existence and reproduction of the hegemon / the hegemonic 
power is based on its ability to maintain its primacy and superiority mainly in terms of 
material capabilities. Legitimacy does play an important role in this reading, but 
compared to material capabilities its role is secondary. Moreover, the concepts of the 
hegemon and hegemony, to a great extend, overlap. Hegemony is the hegemon’s period 
of rule as well as the international infrastructure created by this rule, and this 
period/infrastructure ends/collapses with the decline and collapse of the hegemon. Robert 
Gilpin’s work on War and Change in World Politics (1981), with its focus on hegemonic 
ascendancy, hegemonic wars, and hegemonic decline is a seminal and representative 
work of this approach to Hegemony. The same with Paul Kennedy’s work on The Rise 
and Fall of the Great Powers (1987). Stephen Krasner’s work on State Power and the 
Structure of International Trade (1976) and all subsequent works and theorists that 
followed this strand of HST should also be included here. Moreover, much of the 
contemporary discussion in mainstream IR about the current US hegemony deals with 
this ‘outside-out’ approach to hegemony (see for instance Mearsheimer, 2001; Ignatieff, 
2003; Kagan, 2003; for elaborated discussions on this ‘outside-out’ approach and its 
limitations in the US case, see also Cox, 2001, 2004; Mann, 2003; Fergusson, 2005; 
Jervis, 2006). Finally, Marxist approaches that emphasise the imperial nature of the US 
hegemony could also be included in this approach (see for instance Laffey and Barkawi, 
2002).   
 
Similarly to the outside-out, the ‘outside-in’ pair points to two clearly defined set of 
actors (agential hegemony) and to an instrumental, top-down, use of power by one of 
these actors (the hegemonic power) over the others.  Yet, here the target of power is 
different. The aim is to affect the very self-understanding and self-conceptualisation of 
those actors subjected to it. Therefore, although instrumentally used by the hegemon, 
power aims at the ‘inside’ of its target-audience. Within this context, hegemony, more 
than everything else, is about consent, shared values, preferences and beliefs, in one word, 
about identity. The reproduction of hegemony is not based on the hegemon’s primacy in 
terms of material capabilities, but on its ability to make the various players existing 
within the hegemonic order keep their faith in the set of beliefs, preferences, values and 
ideas espoused by the hegemon. Consequently, hegemony collapses when those players 
(or the majority or the most influential among them) cease to believe in and defend these 
values, and therefore the hegemon has to revert to threats, promises or violence in order 
to enforce its will. As in the first pair there is also here a significant overlap between the 
concepts of hegemony and hegemon. The decline of the hegemon is accompanied by the 
rise of counter hegemonic projects that come to provide new values, a new commonsense, 
a new hegemony. The approaches that employ such a conceptualisation of hegemony 
employ a third dimension view of power, i.e. power is construed as the ability to affect 
peoples/actors preferences and beliefs (see Lukes, 1974: 21-25). This approach to 
hegemony has its origins to the writings of Antonio Gramsci and thus it is a central 
feature of neo-Gramscian IR scholarship (e.g. Cox, 1993; Gill, 1993; Gill and Mittelman, 
2001; for an overview Bieler and Morton, 2003). Yet, this reading of hegemony on the 
basis of consent, shared values and legitimacy is also adopted by some neoliberal 
scholars.  The work of Joseph Nye on soft power is a good example here. For Nye (2003: 
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74), a hegemon should rule through both hard and soft power. ‘Power is the ability to 
produce the outcomes you want. When someone does something he would otherwise not 
do but for force or inducement, that’s hard power—the use of sticks and carrots. Soft 
power is the ability to secure those outcomes through attraction rather than coercion. It is 
the ability to shape what others want’. Thus, although Nye does not equate hegemony to 
‘soft power’, the latter plays a key role in his conceptualisation and definition of 
hegemony. Thus in terms of movement of power certain aspects of Critical and neoliberal 
IR scholarship seem to converge.  
 
The boundaries between the above approach and the ‘inside-out’ approaches to 
hegemony are thin and blurred.  Both approaches focus on consent, personal values and 
beliefs. Both are referring to a three-dimensional view of power. Yet, there is a key 
difference between them. In the ‘outside-in’ approaches we have a clear set of actors (the 
hegemon and its ‘target audience’) and an instrumental use of power by one actor (the 
hegemon) over the others. Hegemony is achieved through the enforcement of a new 
commonsense within the sphere of influence or rule of the hegemon. In contrast, the 
‘inside-out’ approach employs a different stance. For the inside-out approach there is no 
clear pair of actors, neither the relationship/bond between the involved actors is defined 
and maintained by the use of (three-dimensional) power. In these approaches, hegemony 
is conceptualised in a way of a community that projects its values to its outer 
environment, inviting different people/actors to join or follow/imitate its way of being. 
Yet, this three-dimensional power and energies are not necessarily targeted to any 
specific audience. In this regard, the concept of hegemony, does not signify, as in 
Gramsci, a system in which a ruling actor attempts to transform its interests into universal 
values, in order to maintain its rule. The inside-out approach suggest a kind of hegemony 
that tries to attract and to co-opt but by its very nature it is able to co-exist in harmony in 
a system with multiple and diverse commonsenses. It does not use power instrumentally 
to expand itself and enforce its values to its outer environment. Yet, it does do so with 
those actors that want to become its members. Furthermore, in its effort to influence the 
structures of world politics it employs a rather conciliatory strategy with its (potential) 
competitors. Thus, it can be thought of as a hegemony (or a hegemon) that does not 
behave as such. In many regards, this category seems to describe the way in which many 
authors think of the European Union. Much of the discussion on ‘normative power 
Europe’ (Manners, 2002) and the ‘power of attraction’ (Munuera, 1994; see also Hill, 
2001) seems to endorse this inside-out concept of hegemony. The main difference 
between this literature and the neoliberal soft-power approach being that the latter refers 
to a hegemon that behaves assertively, i.e. it aims to spread its values and rule within the 
sphere of the international and dominate in it. Soft power is conceptualised as part of this 
assertive hegemonic strategy. On the other hand, in the approach described here, 
‘normative power’ and ‘attraction’ are not parts of such an assertive, expansionary 
hegemonic strategy. They are not part of a broader hegemonic plan, but a ‘standing-
alone’ way of hegemony.  
 
Finally, the ‘inside-in’ pair points to a fundamentally different understanding of 
hegemony in comparison to the above categories. Here, hegemony is conceptualised as a 
diffused and decentred apparatus of power that governs human life from its interior. It is 
a set of forces that have been diffused into and are reproduced at the level of the subject. 
Thus, hegemony does not signify a top-down movement of power but a bottom-up one. 
This conceptualisation of hegemony relates to the concept of biopower and, what 
Foucault has referred to as, the passage from ‘disciplinary’ to ‘control’ societies. 
Hegemony in this context is not about imposing constraints (or giving incentives) to 
those subjected to it, but neither is only about influencing their values and preferences. 
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To paraphrase Rose and Miller (1992: 174), hegemony is about ‘‘making up’ citizens 
capable of bearing a kind of regulated freedom.  Personal autonomy is not the antithesis 
of political power, but a key term in its exercise, the more so because most individuals 
are not merely the subjects of power but play a part in its operations’. In a similar manner, 
Hardt and Negri (2000: 23-24) argue that hegemony/empire ‘can achieve an effective 
command over the entire life of the population only when it becomes an integral, vital 
function that every individual embraces and reactivates of his or her own 
accord…Biopower thus refers to the situation in which what is directly at stake in power 
is the production and reproduction of life itself’. These approaches to hegemony are 
based on the assumption that a fundamental shift has occurred in the very nature of the 
being and becoming of social life. Paraphrasing Foucault, we could refer to this shift as 
the passage from ‘disciplinary’ to ‘control’ hegemony. In effect this shift refers to a shift 
in the mode of reproduction of hegemony. In disciplinary hegemony, the power apparatus 
that reproduces hegemony was operating through a whole set of intermediating 
institutions such as the army, the prison, the job and the school. These were ‘time-
specific’ institutional mechanisms, in the sense that the participation of the individuals in 
each of these institutions would have a clear and known-in-advance duration, with a 
concrete beginning and end. In ‘control hegemony’, the time-concreteness of these 
institutions, to a great extend, is dissolved. Instead, it is replaced by a lifetime-span 
involving ever-changing skills, jobs, orientations, selves – a continuous  re-invention of 
one’s self (as Beck and Giddens have put it; see Beck, Giddens and Lash, 1994). As 
Deleuze (1992), argues ‘[i]n the disciplinary societies one was always starting again 
(from school to the barracks, from the barracks to the factory), while in the societies of 
control one is never finished with anything--the corporation, the educational system, the 
armed services being metastable states coexisting in one and the same modulation’ (see 
also Bourdieu, 1998; Zizek, 1999). The most important implication of this shift from 
discipline to control is that hegemony ceases to operate through intermediatory 
institutions, and starts to operate directly through the subject - it becomes an integral, 
vital function that every individual embraces and reactivates of his or her own accord 
(Hardt and Negri, 2000: ibid). Therefore, in the approaches that employ this 
conceptualisation of hegemony there is no ‘head’, no centre, no hegemon. Hegemony has 
become a condition of existence for the subject. The subject cannot live beyond 
hegemony. Yet, hegemony is not understood as constant. Change in the nature of 
hegemony is possible, through resistance at the level of everyday life. Finally, for these 
approaches, the hegemon (construed as the most powerful actor in the system) and 
hegemony are two very distinctive phenomena.  
 
Based on the above typology and analysis we can think of hegemony in  four different 
ways: hegemony as the production of coercion, the production of consent, the production 
of attraction and the production of life. These four dimensions are not of course capable 
of capturing the complexity of the approaches presented above. Yet, they do illuminate 
their key point of difference. Table 2 attempts to summarise the key characteristics of the 
afore-analysed four approaches.  
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Table 2. A Four-Dimensional Approach to Hegemony 
 
Coercion 
 
There is a clear hegemon, in terms of an actor 
(most times a state) that wields overwhelming 
power. 
 
The concepts of the hegemon and hegemony 
overlap (or are used interchangeably).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is a clear pair of actors, the hegemon and 
the ‘others’, that is connected through the use of 
power by the hegemon over the rest of the actors. 
 
One-dimension use of power. Hegemony is based 
on coercion and material power. Thus power 
refers mostly to material capabilities, is used 
instrumentally, and operates ‘top-down’.  
 
 
 
The existence and reproduction of the hegemon 
(and its hegemony) depends on its ability to 
maintain its advantage and primacy in terms of 
material power and capabilities. 
 
Consent 
 
There is a clear hegemon – usually the ‘ruling class’ 
or a state.  
 
The concepts of the hegemon and hegemony overlap 
but are not synonymous. The term hegemony is most 
appropriate because the focus is not on what the 
hegemon is (e.g. her status in terms of military and 
economic power) but on what hegemony is. In this 
regard, the hegemon may behave in ways that 
increase its power/capabilities but undermine its 
hegemony.  
 
There is a clear pair of actors, the hegemon and the 
‘others’, that is connected through the use of power 
by the hegemon over the rest of the actors. 
 
Third-dimension use of power. Hegemony is based 
on consent, and it is defined in terms of the 
hegemon’s capacity to transform its interest into 
commonsense. Power refers to the capacity of 
influencing other actors’ self-understanding and 
values. It is used instrumentally, and operates ‘top-
down’. 
 
The existence and reproduction of hegemony 
depends on the ability of the hegemon to persuade 
the other members of the system about the 
appropriateness and desirability of its values and 
preferences and the legitimacy of its actions.  
Attraction 
 
There is a powerful state, or group of states, that 
wields decisive power. Yet it does not aim to 
dominate in the international system. By its 
nature, it can co-exist with other powerful actors.  
 
The concepts of the hegemon and hegemony 
overlap.  
 
 
 
There is no clear pair of actors that remains 
connected through the use of power by one actor 
(the hegemon) over the rest of the actors. 
 
Third-dimension use of power. Hegemony is 
based on consent and co-opt (‘power of 
attraction’). Power refers to the capacity of 
influencing other actor’s self-understanding and 
values. Yet, power is not targeted to a specific 
audience, and the hegemony it generates can co-
exist with other hegemonic projects 
 
 
The existence and reproduction of hegemony 
depends on the ability of the hegemon to maintain 
its ‘power of attraction’. 
 
Life 
 
There is no hegemon; no core, head, or centre of 
hegemony.  
 
 
 
The concepts of the hegemon (in terms of an actor 
that wields overwhelming power) and hegemony do 
not overlap.  
 
There is no clear pair of actors that remains 
connected through the use of power by one actor (the 
hegemon) over the rest of the actors. 
 
Power is construed as bio-power, i.e. the power to  
produce subjects/subjectivities. It is diffused, 
decentred and deterritorialised and operates ‘from 
within’ the subjects.  
 
 
 
 
Hegemony is a condition of existence. There is no 
life beyond hegemony, but specific aspects of 
hegemony can be resisted and changed. Although it 
is influenced by her, hegemony does not depend on 
the existence of the hegemon. 
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The above approach to hegemony, as movement of power, has a number of important 
advantages. First, it shifts the focus of hegemony analysis from the limiting and well-
separated compartments of IR theories to the phenomenon of hegemony itself. Thus, the 
point of departure and focus of the analysis is on how hegemony operates and how it is 
produced and maintained, rather than on the foundational assumptions of the various IR 
theories. This shift in the focus allows us also to capture and examine the overlapping 
areas of the different IR theories with regard to the conceptualisation and study of 
hegemony in world politics. Second, it allows us to account for variation in the intentions 
of different hegemons (e.g. domination vs. attraction). Thus we are better equipped to 
capture the different agential dimensions of hegemony. Third, the proposed approach 
deals with the phenomenon of hegemony as a social relation grounded in specific social 
networks, rather than as a decontextualised phenomenon referring to a unilateral use of 
power. It also permits us to examine the different natures that this relation can take and 
the implications that these different natures may have for the various players involved in 
the hegemonic system. Fourth, studying hegemony as a movement of power allows us to 
move beyond a limiting dichotomy between agents and structures – agential and 
structural hegemony. In particular it allows us to overcome the confines of agential 
approaches without treating structural influences as material/objective forces independent 
from social relations. It should be acknowledged that the proposed approach is not well-
placed to offer much insight on what are these material/objective forces in specific 
historical periods. It is well-placed however to scrutinise how these forces are actualised 
(or not) in actor’s behaviour. In critical realist parlance then, the movement-of-power 
approach is well placed to interrogate the ‘realm of the actual’.   
 
Until this point, the paper has tried to create an analytical framework able to bring 
together the main competing approaches to hegemony in IR. The next section attempts to 
push this analysis further by discussing the nature of the relationship between these 
different approaches. In doing so we consider the implications of the different approaches 
in strategic and policy making terms, examining at the same time the compatibility of 
these implications and the possibility of building a integrative concept of hegemony in IR.  
 
 
Hegemony: Many and/or One? 
 
The above discussion on the advantages of studying hegemony as a movement of power 
raises a broader question. Should the proposed approach be treated only as an analytical 
framework that brings together the different types of hegemony found in IR, or should it 
be treated as the foundation for a holistic approach to the phenomenon of hegemony. In 
essence, this is a question on the nature of the relationship between the four types of 
hegemony, discussed above: are these types mutually exclusive and ‘incommensurable’ 
phenomena or could they be treated as interacting parts of a single social phenomenon? 
 
For sure there is good reason to keep the different types of hegemony separate. After all, 
these different types do not only point to different understandings of hegemony but also 
to different types of hegemons. For instance, as argued above, ‘attraction’ and ‘coercion’ 
assume very different subjects of hegemony (hegemons). Therefore, keeping the four 
different aspects of hegemony separate guarantees that we are not loosing sight of the 
complexities and contradictory aspects and manifestations of the phenomenon of 
hegemony, as well as of the different natures of hegemons found in world politics.  
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Yet, if we treat the concept of the hegemon not as a solid, unitary actor but as a complex 
social institution with an unstable and dynamic identity, within which operate groups 
with different, antagonistic even mutually exclusive projects, strategies and visions, then 
there might be room for an holistic reading of the phenomenon of hegemony. In such a 
reading the different types of hegemony would remain distinct, but one could approach 
and study them as constitutive parts of a wider whole. Thus, for instance, although a 
certain hegemony may be based on coercion this should not be interpreted as meaning 
that the hegemon is a solid, unitary actor. There may be significant actors in operation 
within the hegemonic power who try to change its dominant coercive logic and strategies 
(e.g. from coercion to attraction or consent) while maintaining its hegemonic status. To 
approach and study hegemony in these terms we need to focus on the relationship and 
balance between the different hegemonic movements operating within each 
hegemon/hegemony. Following this rationale we could think of hegemony as a four-sided 
pyramid (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: A Holistic View on Hegemony 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The a-canonical shape of Figure 1 aims to signify the dynamic, antagonistic and ever-
changing relations among the different movements of power within a hegemonic order. 
The size of each of the pyramid’s sides as well as its overall shape, are unstable and in 
constant motion. Furthermore, as in the vast majority of similar analyses that refer to 
power, the four sides/elements of hegemony should not be treated as independent from 
each other. They are in constant interaction, and changes that occur at any single side of 
hegemony affect the overall movement of power, and may lead to changes in the overall 
nature of hegemony (and the hegemon). For instance, in the hypothetical case of 
hegemony depicted in Figure 1, a significant increase in the ‘outside-out’ movement of 
power (coercion) would disrupt the existing balance between coercion and consent. 
Arguably, a similar change occurred in the case of the US hegemony in the post 9/11 era. 
Similarly, should the EU decide to increase its ‘outside-in’ (consent) and/or ‘outside-out’ 
(coercion) power this may have negative repercussions for its ‘inside-out’ power of 
attraction. In this framework of analysis the hegemon does not have a stable, solid and 
coercion 
consent 
 
attraction 
life 
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singular hegemonic identity. It is a complex social whole where competing, and many 
times opposing, agents, projects and visions exist and struggle with each other, and 
whose identity is not exhausted in its hegemonic identity. It is in this manner, for instance, 
that we can discuss about both coercion and attraction in the case of US hegemony. For 
the hegemon US is a complex social entity, certain elements of which can exert an 
‘inside-out’ influence (attraction) that is independent from its current assertive hegemonic 
role and policies. Thus although attraction could never become the dominant 
element/movement-of-power in the case of an actor that behaves as hegemon at the 
global level, it may still constitute a considerable part of the jigsaw of international 
hegemony.               
 
Another important point here is the place and role of the ‘inside-in’ movement of power 
(life). In the holistic approach sketched above, life –no matter what is the specific shape 
of the hegemonic four-sided pyramid– constitutes always the base of the pyramid. It acts 
as the background against, and on the basis of which the other three movements of power 
operate. Being dispersed and subjective (in the most fundamental meaning of this term), 
the ‘inside-in’ movement has the greatest degree of autonomy in comparison to the other 
three movements – it is the movement that has the strongest structural character. Yet 
‘life’ is not insulated from the other movements. Any changes in the latter do impact on 
‘life’, even if changes in the latter take more time to materialise. Thus significant changes 
in terms of coercion, consent or attraction within a hegemonic order do gradually have an 
impact on the production and nature of subjectivities within this order, and these new 
subjectivities will affect any future hegemonic strategies or orders.  
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